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David A. Wise 
This is the  seventh in a  series of  volumes on the economics of  aging. The 
previous ones were The Economics of  Aging, Issues in the Economics of Aging, 
Topics in the Economics of Aging, Studies in the Economics of Aging, Advances 
in the Economics of  Aging, and Inquiries in the Economics of  Aging. The pa- 
pers in this volume discuss the implications  of the rapid  spread of personal 
retirement saving, discuss several aspects of health care, investigate important 
methodological advances in studying aging issues, and consider new aspects 
of inequality. The papers are summarized in this introduction,  which draws 
heavily on the authors’ own summaries. 
Personal Retirement Plans 
Three papers direct attention to important  aspects of  personal  retirement 
saving plans: their effect on personal saving, the rapid increase in their use in 
recent  years  and future projected  use, and the taxing of pension  saving. In 
addition, using the analysis of the saving effect of individual retirement ac- 
count (IRA) and 401 (k) plans as a backdrop, there is an extended discussion 
of how personal  retirement  saving might be viewed from a behavioral per- 
spective. 
Their Effect on Saving 
Contributions to personal retirement saving programs now exceed contribu- 
tions to traditional  employer-provided defined benefit  and defined contribu- 
tions plans. In “Personal Retirement  Saving Programs and Asset Accumula- 
David A. Wise is the John E Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy at the John F.  Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, and the director for Health and Retirement Programs 
at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1 2  David A. Wise 
tion: Reconciling the Evidence,” James Poterba, Steven Venti, and I review the 
series of analyses on the saving effect of IRA and 401(k) plans that we have 
undertaken over the past several years and present additional results. We also 
give considerable attention to the analyses undertaken by others. We conclude 
that the weight of the evidence provides strong support for the view that contri- 
butions to these programs represent largely new saving. 
A large fraction of American families reach retirement age with virtually no 
personal financial assets. The median level of all personal financial assets of 
families with heads aged 55-64  was only $8,300 in 1991; excluding IRA and 
401(k) balances the median was only $3,000. Almost 20 percent of families 
had no financial assets at all. Other than social security and pension benefits, 
and illiquid housing wealth, the typical family has very limited resources to 
meet unforeseen expenses. 
The IRA and 401(k) programs introduced in the early 1980s were intended 
to encourage individual saving. Although  very small at the beginning of the 
decade, by  1989 contributions to all personal retirement saving plans exceeded 
contributions to traditional employer-provided pension  plans. Whether these 
programs increase net saving can be of critical importance to future genera- 
tions of older Americans and to the health of the economy in general. The issue 
remains an important question of economic debate. In a series of papers based 
on very different methods of analysis we have concluded that a large fraction 
of the contributions to these accounts represents new saving. Our previous re- 
search is summarized here, along with several new results. 
As interest in the saving effect of these programs evolved, several other in- 
vestigators also directed attention to the issue. In some instances, alternative 
analyses came to conclusions  that differed dramatically  from ours. Thus  in 
describing our results we have tried to point out the differences between our 
methods and alternative approaches that have been used to address the same 
questions. 
The key impediment to determining the saving effect of IRAs and 401(k)s 
is saver heterogeneity. Some people save and others do not, and the savers tend 
to save more in all forms. For example, families with IRAs also have more 
conventional savings than families without IRAs. Thus a continuing goal of 
our analyses has been to consider different methods of controlling for hetero- 
geneity. The methods that could be used when each analysis was conducted 
were largely dependent on the available data. As new data became available we 
used alternative and possibly more robust methods to control for heterogeneity. 
We  first present our results, organized by the method used to control for 
heterogeneity. In each case the question is whether IRA and 401(k) contribu- 
tions substitute for conventional financial asset saving, We also discuss closely 
related results reported by others. While early work in this area focused on the 
potential  substitution between  IRA assets and liquid financial assets, subse- 
quent analyses considered the potential  substitution between personal  retire- 
ment saving plan assets and employer-provided  pension  assets and housing 3  Introduction 
equity. Thus we also consider other margins of substitution, particularly the 
possibility that saving in these programs is financed by  drawing down home 
equity. Finally, we address the divergence between our conclusions based on 
Survey of Consumer Finances  data and the parametric  analysis of the same 
data by Gale and Scholz (1  994). 
We emphasize that no single method can provide sure control for all forms 
of heterogeneity. Taken together, however, we believe that our analyses address 
the key complications presented by heterogeneity. In our view, the weight of 
the evidence, based  on the many  nonparametric  approaches discussed here, 
provides strong support for the view that contributions to both IRA and 401(k) 
plans represent largely new  saving.  Some of the evidence  is directed to the 
IRA program, other evidence to the 401(k) plan, and some of the evidence to 
both plans jointly. We believe that the evidence is strong in all cases. We have 
devoted particular effort to explaining why different approaches, sometimes 
based on the same data, have led to different conclusions. In some instances, 
we believe that the limitations of the methods used by others have undermined 
the reliability of their results. 
Viewed from a Behavioral Perspective 
Increasingly, economists are questioning standard analysis based on strong 
rationality  and typical  maximization  assumptions.  Many of  the findings on 
IRA and 401(k) saving behavior and the saving effects of these plans are left 
unexplained by standard theories of saving. Thus there is considerable motiva- 
tion to look more broadly for explanations of saving behavior. A realistic expla- 
nation  of  saving must recognize much broader economic and psychological 
determinants  of  individual  saving  decisions.  Using  the  Poterba-Venti-Wise 
analysis as a backdrop, David Laibson in his comment considers the insights 
that behavioral economics bring to the discussion of personal retirement sav- 
ing. He discusses four behavioral phenomena: bounded rationality, self-control 
problems,  peer group sensitivities,  and overoptimistic  beliefs.  He then  dis- 
cusses empirical strategies, suggested by the behavioral phenomena, that might 
be used to further our understanding of saving behavior. He finds that “most of 
the behavioral analysis that I have reviewed implies that tax-deferred retire- 
ment  instruments  will  raise  net  national  savings.” After  several cautionary 
notes, he goes on to conclude:  “Nevertheless, the prospects  for 401(k)s and 
similar tax-deferred retirement instruments seem bright. Social psychology re- 
search has identified a core set of features of successful behavioral interven- 
tions. The 401(k) seems to have been designed by someone who intuitively or 
formally understood those lessons.” 
Implications of Their Rapid Spread 
About half of families now  are eligible for a 401(k) plan, and the use of 
these plans is spreading rapidly. In “Implications  of Rising Personal Retire- 
ment Saving” James Poterba, Steven Venti, and  I consider the projected use of 4  David A. Wise 
these plans and implications for the retirement  saving of  future retirees. We 
conclude that the cohort that reaches age 65 between 2025 and 2035 will have 
40 1  (k)  assets that greatly exceed the personal financial assets of current retirees 
and that these assets are likely to exceed their social security assets, perhaps 
by a great deal. 
Contributions to IRAs grew rapidly until  1986, when $38 billion was con- 
tributed to these accounts. The Tax Reform Act of  1986 curtailed this program, 
and by  1990 contributions had fallen to only $10 billion. They were only $8 
billion in 1994. On the other hand, the 401(k) plan has grown unimpeded since 
1982. Now contributions to the 401(k) plan alone are greater than contributions 
to traditional employer-provided defined benefit and defined contribution plans 
combined. In 1993, 401 (k) plan contributions exceeded $69 billion. Approxi- 
mately 45 to 50 percent of  employees were eligible for 401(k) plans in that 
year, and over 70 percent of those who were eligible to contribute did in fact 
make contributions. 
The increase in personal retirement saving can have important implications 
for the accumulation of  retirement saving for future generations of  retirees. 
Now, a large fraction of families approach retirement with virtually  no per- 
sonal financial asset saving. The median of personal financial assets of Health 
and  Retirement  Survey (HRS) families-whose  heads  were  ages 51-61  in 
1992-was  approximately $7,000. This includes all financial assets held out- 
side IRAs, 401(k)s, and related  retirement saving accounts. Perhaps half of 
all families rely almost exclusively on social security benefits for support in 
retirement. The spread of 401(k) plans in particular could change this picture 
substantially. In this paper we simulate the 401(k) assets of future generations 
of retirees and compare these assets with the social security and other assets 
of the households who are approaching retirement now. 
Our goal is to project 401(k) assets of households who will retire 35 or 40 
years from now. We direct attention in particular to the cohort that was age 33 
in 1993, and will be age 65 in 2025. We compare the projected 401(k) assets 
of this cohort to the assets of the HRS respondents. We first trace backward to 
obtain approximate lifetime earnings histories of the HRS respondents. Life- 
time earnings are grouped  into  10 deciles, assuming that over their careers 
household earnings were in the same decile. Contributions to 401(k) plans are 
projected for each lifetime earnings decile. Thus we are able to ask what level 
of 401(k) assets such families would have accumulated, in  1992 dollars, had 
they had  the  same earnings histories as the  HRS respondents but  different 
amounts of contributions to 401(k) plans. We base the projections on the past 
growth in 401(k) participation rates and on the fraction of earnings contributed 
to the plans. The growth in participation  since their inception, however, has 
been enormous and simple projections-based  on recent increases in partici- 
pation-are  not very meaningful. Therefore, we make what we believe to be 
plausible inferences about future participation. 5  Introduction 
We have projected  the accumulation of 401(k) assets at retirement for the 
cohort that was age 25 in  1984 and the cohort that was age 15 in  1984. The 
cohort 25 projections are based on what we hope are plausible assumptions 
about future 401(k) participation rates. Indeed, our intention is that these pro- 
jections be  conservative  and thus likely to underestimate realized  contribu- 
tions. The cohort 15 projections are further from historical rates but we hope 
are also based  on plausible assumptions about potential  future participation. 
For comparison,  we  have also made projections  assuming universal  401(k) 
coverage. 
In each case, the accumulation of 401(k) assets is large compared to current 
wealth at retirement. Because a large fraction of current retirees depend almost 
entirely on social security benefits for support in retirement, we have compared 
future 401(k) assets to social security wealth. Our cohort 25 projections sug- 
gest that when  this cohort reaches  retirement  age-they  will  be  age 65 in 
2025-their  average 401(k) assets are likely to exceed their average social se- 
curity assets. But the projections also suggest that relative to social security 
wealth, 401(k) assets will vary a great deal with lifetime earnings. While this 
is surely true, we are uncertain about the exact magnitude of the variation by 
earnings decile. The projections suggest that the lowest earnings decile may 
have very little in 401(k) assets. But for families with lifetime earnings above 
the lowest two or three  deciles, 401(k)  assets are likely to be a substantial 
fraction of social security wealth. For families with lifetime earnings above the 
median, 401(k) assets could exceed social security wealth, and this would al- 
most surely be true for families in the top four earnings deciles. 
Universal 401(k) participation would likely yield 401(k) assets at retirement 
greater than social security wealth for all but the lowest lifetime earnings dec- 
ile, and possibly for the lowest decile as well. The intermediate cohort 15 pro- 
jections yield 401(k) accumulations that could represent a substantial fraction 
of social security wealth for lifetime earnings histories as low as the 2d decile. 
Thus we believe that 401(k) assets will almost surely be an important com- 
ponent of the retirement wealth of future generations of retirees and could be 
the dominant component for a large fraction of them. 
The Taxing of Retirement Saving 
In “The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap” John Shoven 
and I consider the greatly  increased  tax burden imposed on pension  saving 
since 1982. In particular, we address the implications of the excess distribution 
and  excess  accumulation  taxes that  were  introduced  virtually  unnoticed  in 
1986 legislation. We also consider the important implications of full estate tax 
imposed on pension assets, which before 1982 were not subject to estate taxes 
at all. We conclude that these taxes can severely limit the advantage of personal 
retirement saving and pension assets that pass through an estate can be virtu- 
ally confiscated by tax rate that are often as high as 95 percent or more. Ironi- 6  David A. Wise 
cally, the excess distribution and the excess accumulation taxes were elimi- 
nated as part of the Tax Relief Act of July 1997, we believe in no small measure 
due to the attention that our analysis brought to this issue. 
The recent legislation that raised the minimum wage was accompanied by 
the Small Business Job Protection Act of  1996, which, among other things, 
temporarily (for years 1997-99)  suspends the 15 percent excise tax on “excess 
distributions” from qualified pension plans. Surely, few people know about the 
excise tax in the first place, let alone its suspension. In fact, while people are 
keenly  aware that pensions  allow them to save before-tax dollars and com- 
pound their investment returns without current taxation, it is our impression 
that very few people know how pension assets are taxed on withdrawal or on 
the death of the owner of the pension. In this paper we present a comprehensive 
examination of the taxation of pensions, with particular emphasis on large pen- 
sion accumulations. The analysis answers a number of questions: (1) How do 
the excess distribution excise tax and its companion excess accumulation ex- 
cise tax work? How do these taxes interact with the personal income tax sys- 
tems and the estate tax? (2) Should only high-income individuals be concerned 
with these taxes or might they be imposed on people with relatively  modest 
incomes? (3) Are pension plans still attractive saving vehicles once these ex- 
cise taxes are applicable? For example, should someone whose base pension 
plan is likely to trigger either the excess distribution tax or the excess accumu- 
lation tax participate in a supplemental 40 1  (k) plan? (4) Are pensions equally 
advantageous for stock investments and bond investments? If not, which assets 
should be held inside a pension plan and which should be held outside the 
plan? (5) Does it always make sense to delay distributions from pension plans 
as long as possible, thereby maximizing the tax deferral advantage that they 
offer? (6) How are pension  accumulations  treated when  they  are part of  an 
estate? We focus on these microeconomic issues without discussing the social 
desirability of current tax policy. However, we should acknowledge at the out- 
set that we see little economic merit in a penalty excise tax applying to people 
who save “too much” through the pension system. Most observers of the U.S. 
economy agree that the country’s saving rate is too low. Since we know that 
savers only capture a fraction of the social return  on their investments,  it is 
unclear why the biggest savers in the economy should be penalized. 
The Small Business Job Protection Act of  1996 is just the latest in a series 
of bills over the past 15 years that has changed the way pensions are taxed. To 
illustrate how radically the rules have changed, we consider four individuals 
with exactly the same wealth (and composition of wealth) at the time of their 
deaths, each of whom died at age 70. They differ only in the date of  death- 
1982, 1984, 1988, or  1996. The estates,  all valued  at $1.9 million  in  1996 
dollars, are composed of $600,000  in nonpension  assets including a house, 
$1.2 million in a defined contribution pension plan, and $100,000 in a supple- 
mental plan such as an IRA or a Keogh plan. The estates of these individuals 
faced radically different tax laws. One important difference is that before 1983 7  Introduction 
pension accumulations were completely exempt from the estate tax. The result 
is that in 1982 the heir was able to consume more than 60 percent of the value 
of the inherited supplemental pension plan; the combined tax rate was less than 
40  percent. In contrast, by  1996-because  of  the estate tax and the excess 
accumulation tax in particular-the  heir could spend less than  15 percent of 
the value of the inherited supplemental plan. This case is far from extreme. We 
describe cases in which the total marginal tax rate on assets in qualified pen- 
sion plans passing through an estate ranges from 92 to 96.5 percent. The high- 
est such rate we have seen exceeds 99 percent. Thus we believe that any pen- 
sion saving strategy adopted more than a few years ago needs to be reviewed, 
given how drastically the rules have changed. And, because large pension accu- 
mulations are taxed so heavily when they pass through an estate, withdrawing 
pension assets before death, if at all possible, needs to be considered. 
The excess distribution tax and the excess accumulation tax were included 
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to prevent people from taking advantage of the 
favorable tax treatment of pensions to amass wealth beyond what is thought to 
be reasonably necessary for a comfortable retirement. We believe that the wis- 
dom of this policy is open to question. People who increase saving because of 
the tax shelter opportunity offered by pension plans, or for other reasons like 
the payroll  deduction feature of many pension plans,  do not reduce the re- 
sources available to the rest of the population. In fact, individual savers reap 
only a portion of the social return of the incremental capital. If the extra pen- 
sion saving results in extra capital for the economy, then this extra capital pays 
corporation income taxes and the pension saver ultimately  pays personal in- 
come taxes, which improves  the overall budget  picture  for everyone  in  the 
economy. The social return to the capital significantly exceeds the private re- 
turn received by the pension saver. 
Our analysis has led to several striking results: 
The tax rates faced by  pensions deemed “too large” can be extraordi- 
narily high. The marginal rate on distributions over $155,000  can be 
roughly  61.5 percent. The effective marginal tax rate faced by  large 
pension accumulations passing through an estate can dwarf this rate, 
however, reaching 92 to 96.5 percent. 
These high tax rates, which include the excess distribution and the ex- 
cess accumulation taxes, can be faced by savers who do not have ex- 
traordinarily  high incomes. The “success tax” is not limited to the rich 
but rather primarily affects lifetime savers. For example, someone who 
works between  ages 25 and 70, makes $40,000 at age 50, and contri- 
butes  10 percent to a pension plan invested in the S&P 500 will likely 
be penalized by the success tax for overusing the pension provisions. 
The advantage of pensions relative to conventional saving is greatly re- 
duced  and  in  many  cases eliminated once accumulations  exceed  the 
amounts that will trigger the success tax. Even in cases where additional 8  David A. Wise 
pension saving still provides more resources in retirement than conven- 
tional saving, when  the plan  owner dies, the heirs get less than they 
would have if the saving had been done outside of a pension plan. 
The advantage of pension saving is reduced by the availability of tax- 
advantaged investments outside of pension plans. Examples are tax-free 
municipal bonds and tax-efficient low-dividend stock portfolios. 
Not only is there little, if any, incentive to continue to save via pensions 
once the excess distribution and excess accumulation taxes become ap- 
plicable, there is a strong incentive to withdraw  money while  living 
rather than risk the nearly confiscatory tax rates faced by pension assets 
transferred through estates. This means that there is an incentive to con- 
sume more in retirement than would otherwise be the case. 
Individuals can realize significant efficiency  gains by allocating their 
investments appropriately between pension accounts and outside hold- 
ings.  Simply locating assets in their most  advantageous environment 
could improve the net proceeds of saving by almost 25 percent. 
Now that it is recognized that pensions are the primary vehicle for personal 
saving in the economy, we emphasize that a careful reconsideration of the leg- 
islation of the early and mid-1980s is called for. Once the excess distribution 
and excess accumulation taxes are understood, we believe these taxes are likely 
to become quite effective at discouraging pension saving and hence will reduce 
economic welfare in an economy that  surely has lower than optimal saving 
now. 
Health: Spending Patterns and Implications and Effect on Work 
A Forty-Year Perspective 
The rising cost of health care has become an important public issue in almost 
all developed countries. In “The Medical Costs of the Young and Old: A Forty- 
Year Perspective” David Cutler and Ellen Meara investigate the nature of the 
rise in health care costs in the United States and the gains in health outcomes 
associated  with this spending. They find that, just as medical spending at a 
point in time is concentrated among high-cost users, spending growth has also 
been concentrated among the high-cost users. They find further that the growth 
in expenditures for high-cost users has been accompanied by gains in health 
outcomes for these users. 
It is widely known that medical costs have increased over time. In the United 
States, as in most of  the developed world, medical spending growth has ex- 
ceeded income growth by several percentage points per year for three decades 
or longer. In country after country, the cost of medical care has become a major 
public sector issue. 9  Introduction 
But much less is known about what medical spending is buying us. Is medi- 
cal spending valuable or wasteful? Should we want to limit total spending or 
increase it? The answer to this question is by no means clear. On the one hand 
is voluminous evidence that medical spending conveys great value. Random- 
ized clinical trials, for example, routinely document the benefits of new phar- 
maceuticals and medical devices. Cutler and Meara suggest that most people 
would prefer today’s medical system to the medical system of  30 years ago, 
even  given the much higher cost of  medical care today. This  suggests that 
people are on net better off because of the additional medical care spending 
than they would be without it. 
On the other hand is a great sense that medical care often brings little in the 
way of health benefit. Nearly one-third of Medicare spending occurs in the last 
six months of life, which has been interpreted as evidence that a lot of medical 
care is wasted on those who will in any case not survive. Other studies such as 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment show that putting people in less gen- 
erous insurance policies reduces their spending on medical services but does 
not affect their health. And direct estimates of the value of medical care typi- 
cally find that, at the margin, a substantial amount of medical care has little or 
no health benefit. 
Cutler and Meara try to understand why medical care has become so expen- 
sive over time and what has been its value to society. They focus particularly 
on medical spending by  age. Their analysis is based on periodic  surveys of 
national health expenditures conducted in 1953, 1963, 1970, 1977, and 1987. 
Their  analysis  of  age-based  spending  documents  two  conclusions.  First, 
there has been a dramatic change in the distribution of medical spending over 
time. While spending on medical care has increased for all people, it has in- 
creased disproportionately for the very young and the old. Over the 24-year 
period from 1963 through  1987, per person spending on infants increased by 
10 percent per year, and per person spending on the elderly increased by 8 
percent per year, compared to only 4.7 percent per year for the “middle-aged.” 
The share of medical care spending for infants and the elderly doubled from 
15 to over 30 percent. 
The authors further show that essentially all of the disproportionate growth 
of spending for the very young and the old is accounted for by high-cost users 
within those groups. For infants, 90 percent of the excess spending increase 
over the middle-aged is accounted for by the top 10 percent of the spending 
distribution. For the elderly, the equivalent share is 70 percent. Thus, the au- 
thors emphasize, to understand the concentration of medical spending by age, 
we need to understand the concentration of spending among high-cost users. 
Cutler and Meara also consider who the high-cost users of medical care are. 
They show that a substantial amount of  high-cost medical use is associated 
with the increasing technological capability of medicine. Among infants, high- 
cost users are premature babies with substantial respiratory or other acute con- 
ditions. For the elderly, high-cost users are generally patients with severe car- 10  David A. Wise 
diovascular problems or cancer. For both infants and the elderly, the capacity 
to devote many more resources to the most pressing cases has increased over 
time. 
Finally, they consider how health outcomes for premature  infants and the 
sick elderly have changed over time. They find  substantial  health  improve- 
ments  in most of  the categories  of  high-cost  medical care.  Infant mortality 
among very low birth weight infants has fallen substantially at exactly the time 
when the cost of these infants has risen most rapidly. And mortality improve- 
ments  among the elderly  have been  especially prominent  in cardiovascular 
care, where spending increases have been most dramatic. The authors empha- 
size that their analysis is not causal: “We do not have any direct link between 
the technologies we discuss . . . and the outcomes we analyze.” They conclude, 
however, that their results suggest such a link is plausible. 
End-of-Life Expenditures 
Perhaps  a quarter of  Medicare expenditures each year are for the care of 
recipients who die in that year. This has led some to conclude that much of 
end-of-life expenditure must be wasteful. But in their paper “Diagnosis and 
Medicare Expenditures  at the End of Life” Alan Garber, Thomas MaCurdy, 
and Mark McClellan  find that characteristics  of high-cost users who die are 
very similar to those of like patients who live. Thus they conclude that it will 
be difficult to formulate policies that limit expenditures for persons who will 
die without at the same time limiting care for those who may live. 
Expenditures for health care at the end of life have been the object of consid- 
erable policy interest. To many observers, aggressive health care administered 
shortly before death is wasteful, at least in retrospect,  and there is no doubt 
that elderly Americans use health care heavily before they die. In 1990,  the 6.6 
percent of Medicare recipients who died accounted for 22 percent of program 
expenditures. Some question the benefits of such care, especially because se- 
vere morbidity  and disability  may compromise any years of  life potentially 
gained from such treatments in the very old. The increasing use at advanced 
ages of  costly and aggressive health interventions, whose impact on both the 
quality and length of life is often unknown, exacerbates these concerns. For 
example, the  use  of  radical  prostatectomy  for invasive  prostate  cancer in- 
creased threefold between  1983 and 1989, and the rate at which both new and 
old major operations are performed in the elderly increased dramatically from 
1972 to 1981 and from 1984 to 1991. 
Nonetheless,  the  policy  significance  of  end-of-life  care is  uncertain. Al- 
though they consume a large share of health dollars, patients nearing death are 
not the main source of large Medicare payments. Most high-cost elderly pa- 
tients are survivors, not decedents. In 1990, for example, 8 percent of Medicare 
enrollees with over $10,000 in Medicare costs accounted for 65 percent of all 
Medicare expenditures.  Even if every enrollee who died that year generated 
more than $10,000 in payments, they could have only been responsible for at 11  Introduction 
most one-third of this total. In addition, some studies suggest that the elderly 
who are most likely to die are not responsible for the greatest expenditures. 
An even more important limitation of an exclusive focus on end-of-life ex- 
penditures is its implicitly retrospective nature. If health care providers knew 
ex ante which patients would die despite their interventions, expenditures on 
dying patients could potentially  be reduced. Yet  often it is impossible, even 
with detailed clinical records, to predict individual patient mortality with suf- 
ficient specificity to influence medical decision making. Furthermore, specific 
policies designed to reduce end-of-life expenditures, such as advance direc- 
tives and “do not resuscitate”  orders, seem to have had only a modest impact 
on overall expenditures. 
Although there is growing disenchantment with policies designed to identify 
and  avert “futile care”  at the  individual patient  level,  the  consequences  of 
population-level policies merit further exploration. Little is known about the 
impact on the cost and outcomes of elderly populations with major illnesses 
of  policies  that  would  lead to  a generally  more  parsimonious  approach to 
health care delivery. Would efforts designed to limit major operations, aggres- 
sive diagnostic approaches, or care delivered in intensive care units lead to an 
increase in mortality rates, health complications, and other adverse outcomes 
in the populations with major illness? Would substantial cost savings result 
from associated reductions in technology use? 
As a first step toward addressing these questions, Garber et a]. explore the 
basic characteristics of Medicare recipients during the time approaching their 
deaths. What characteristics of patients are associated with high-cost care and 
high probability of death? Can these characteristics be used to identify individ- 
uals and populations with major illnesses prospectively, to guide policies on 
the use of intensive treatments? What is the distribution of costs and survival 
across high-risk illnesses, and across individuals with a given illness, and how 
are they correlated? They report the results of analyses of expenditures patterns 
for Medicare decedents and the associated Medicare expenditures. 
Like previous investigators, the authors find that Medicare expenditures for 
decedents decline with advancing age. Overall, their results confirm that dece- 
dents have disproportionately high Medicare expenses. But a comparison with 
high-cost users suggests that many of the characteristics of decedents are simi- 
lar to those of high-cost Medicare enrollees who do not die during a given 
period. The authors conclude that, at least based on the information available 
in Medicare claims files, it will be difficult to formulate policies to limit expen- 
ditures for individuals in the last year of life without simultaneously limiting 
health  care delivered  to sick Medicare recipients who have the potential to 
survive. 
Correlation of Expenditures within Families 
Work reported in the previous volume on the economics of aging concluded 
that the potential persistence over time in individual medical expenditures does 12  David A. Wise 
not critically limit the feasibility  of medical saving accounts, in conjunction 
with catastrophic health insurance, as a means of helping to control health care 
costs efficiently (Eichner, McClellan, and Wise 1998). The problem posed by 
persistence could, however, be worse to the extent that expenditures by family 
members are correlated, so that persistent expenditures by  one member tend 
to be  accompanied by  persistent  expenditures  by  other family  members  as 
well. In his paper “The Impact of Intrafamily Correlations on the Viability of 
Catastrophic Insurance” Matthew Eichner concludes that such correlation is 
not sufficient to importantly limit the feasibility of medical saving accounts. 
This paper explores the relationship  between health  care expenditures  of 
spouses. If  expenditures  are due largely to random  shocks, the  household’s 
medical  expenditures  are  smoothed by  two  or more  family  members  each 
drawing from the distribution. On the other hand, if the shocks are positively 
correlated, the potential exists for negative wealth shocks that are greater than 
those that would be predicted based on studies of the persistence of individual 
medical expenditures over time. Under traditional systems of insurance, with 
relatively  low coinsurance levels, the consequences  of any putative  positive 
correlation across family members in expenditures are relatively mild. But un- 
der the  sort of  high-deductible  insurance that is currently attracting interest 
from the policy community, the wealth and utility effects may be appreciable. 
And under systems that include both  high-deductible insurance and medical 
saving accounts, intrafamily correlations might dramatically change the accu- 
mulation of wealth in such accounts over a working lifetime. 
Matthew Eichner seeks to determine the reasons for intrafamily correlations 
and then to determine where in the distribution of expenditures the correlations 
appear to be strongest. The empirical work in this paper-based  on data from 
two  Fortune  500  firms-suggests  that,  while  correlation  of  expenditures 
among married partners is large at the low end of the expenditure distribution, 
the relation diminishes appreciably in the upper ranges. For example, Eichner 
estimates a correlation for positive expenditures of 0.41 for firm 1 and 0.69 for 
firm 2. But the correlations in expenditures  above $4,000 are only 0.13 and 
0.14, respectively. Thus the correlations are low in the ranges relevant  for a 
discussion of  catastrophic health insurance  schemes. His analysis therefore 
suggests that intrafamily correlation in expenditures does not appreciably in- 
crease persistence in expenditures made toward a family insurance plan and 
thus does not appreciably affect the feasibility of medical saving account insur- 
ance schemes. 
Health Shocks and Labor Supply 
It has long been understood that persons in poor health are more likely than 
otherwise similar persons in better health to leave the labor force. The effect 
of specific health shocks, however, has not been analyzed. Mark McClellan, in 
“Health  Events,  Health  Insurance,  and  Labor  Supply:  Evidence  from  the 
Health and Retirement Survey,” analyzes the effect on labor supply of a variety 13  Introduction 
of  specific health  events, many of which have very large consequences  for 
labor supply. 
The economic consequences of  health problems are reported to be enor- 
mous. For example, many investigators have concluded that the cost to society 
of common health problems such as heart disease, diabetes, and cancer is many 
billions of dollars per year in terms of lost work productivity, intensive medical 
treatments, and additional supportive care. However, McClellan points out that 
estimates have several important limitations. Few data sets have incorporated 
detailed information on health problems and economic circumstances such as 
retirement. Consequently, most existing studies have had to combine data from 
different sources, possibly missing important correlations between variables 
such as insurance availability and the occurrence of health problems. 
McClellan uses the first two waves of the HRS to provide insights into how 
changes in health status affect two issues of Considerable  policy interest: health 
insurance coverage and labor supply for middle-aged Americans. His analysis 
of new health events in older Americans in the HRS suggests several conclu- 
sions about the effects of health problems. First, new health events of all types 
are more prevalent in individuals with lower education, income, and wealth 
and are more prevalent in individuals with other prior health conditions  as 
well. These relationships persist after adjusting for age. Second, health events 
may be quite heterogeneous in nature, and thus in their consequences for func- 
tional status and expectations about future functional status, consumption, and 
survival. Only a minority of new health events lead to substantial short-term 
functional  impairments,  even  for  major  events  such  as  heart  attacks  and 
strokes. Old health problems (or health problems for which information was 
not obtained in the HRS) are also important in explaining functional declines, 
Third, different types of health events have quite different consequences for 
health insurance coverage and labor supply. Major health events have particu- 
larly large effects on retirement decisions, and these effects go well beyond 
the consequences of the events for functional status. For example, males with 
major events associated with major functional status declines leave the labor 
force at rates over 40 percentage points higher than males with major func- 
tional status declines in the absence of new health events. New chronic health 
problems have milder, though significant, effects on increasing rates of labor 
force exit beyond their association with functional declines alone. In contrast, 
health problems that are unlikely to have long-term consequences for health 
(accidents) are not associated with additional labor force departures. Though 
these health events have enormous significance for labor force departure rates, 
they have only modest impact on individuals’ self-reported retirement status, 
especially for males in couples and single females. Examining the subsequent 
labor supply of individuals with these events is thus a question of considerable 
importance for understanding the long-term impact of health events. 
In conjunction  with their effects on labor supply, health events also have 
substantial effects on health insurance coverage, especially for males. Health 14  David A. Wise 
events are associated with small increases in the probability of having health 
insurance, despite the fact that they tend to lead to reductions in private insur- 
ance coverage, particularly for males and for individuals without retiree insur- 
ance coverage. These reductions in private insurance coverage are offset by 
increased coverage through government insurance programs, primarily Medi- 
care, as a result of qualification through the disability insurance system. These 
insurance changes are more related to the actual occurrence of disability than 
the labor supply changes, though major health events do lead to more switches 
to government insurance regardless of  functional status change. 
Methodological Innovations 
Measuring Household Consumption and Saving 
An important advance in the HRS is the use of bracketing methods to mea- 
sure household assets, consumption, income, and other values. If when asked, 
for example, “How much money do you have in bank savings accounts?’  the 
respondent gives a dollar value, the information is clear. But a large fraction 
of respondents-in  some instances as many as 40 percent or more-give  no 
answer or say they do not know. In the HRS, these respondents are pressed 
further by asking whether the amount is, for example, less than $5,000. If the 
response is no, the respondent is asked, for example, whether it is between 
$5,000 and $20,000. And so forth. The sequence is referred to as “unfolding 
brackets.” Following a dollar value question with unfolding bracket questions 
very substantially reduces the nonresponse rate, perhaps reducing nonresponse 
from 40 percent to only a few percent in some instances. But the brackets also 
present a problem called “anchoring”-that  is, to the interval at which the 
sequence of bracket questions starts. In “Consumption and Savings Balances 
of the Elderly: Experimental  Evidence  on Survey Response  Bias,”  Michael 
Hurd, Daniel McFadden, Harish Chand, Li Gan, Angela Memll, and Michael 
Roberts consider the effect of anchoring on estimated consumption and saving. 
They find that variation in bracket starting values can change estimated values 
enormously-in  some examples by as much as 100 percent. 
The authors emphasize that a prerequisite for understanding the economic 
behavior of  the elderly, and the impacts of public policy  on their health  and 
well-being, is accurate data on key economic variables such as income, con- 
sumption, and assets, as well as on expectations regarding future economic 
and demographic events such as major health costs, disabilities, and death. 
Standard practice is to elicit such information in economic  surveys, relying 
on respondents’  statements regarding the variables  in question. The authors 
emphasize, however, that economic studies are often too sanguine about the 
reliability of subjects’ statements regarding objective economic data. They fo- 
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nomic variables and show that anchoring bias is a significant issue in consump- 
tion and savings variables of key interest for study of the elderly. 
Anchoring  describes a family of effects observed in many psychological 
studies of beliefs about uncertain quantities. A psychological  explanation for 
the phenomenon of anchoring is that a prompt creates in the subject’s mind, at 
least temporarily, the possibility  that the  uncertain quantity could be either 
above or below the prompt. This could result from classical psychophysical 
discrimination errors, or from a cognitive process in which the subject treats 
the question as a problem-solving task and seeks an appropriate framework for 
“constructing” a correct solution, utilizing the prompt as a cue. Both formal 
and informal education train individuals to use problem-solving protocols in 
which responses to questions are based not only on substantive knowledge but 
also on contextual cues as to what a correct response might be. Consequently, 
it should be no surprise if subjects apply these protocols in forming survey re- 
sponses. 
In  psychological  experiments,  anchoring  is  found  even  when  the  gate 
amount is explicitly random, suggesting that there is more to anchoring than 
“rational”  problem  solving.  This could  happen because  subjects  are  sub- 
rational, making cognitive  errors and processing information inconsistently, 
or because they are “superrational,” going beyond the substantive question to 
“model” the mind of  the questioner and form superstitious beliefs about the 
behavior of nature. 
The study uses an experimental module in a panel of  the survey of Asset 
and Health Dynamics among the oldest old to establish that anchoring can 
cause significant  biases  in unfolding bracket  questions on quantitative eco- 
nomic  variables.  In the case of  savings, variation  in  starting values for un- 
folding brackets from $5,000 to $200,000 induces a 100 percent difference in 
estimated median savings. The anchoring is even stronger for consumption: 
increasing the starting value for unfolding brackets from $500 to $5,000 in- 
duces nearly a doubling of estimated median consumption. 
The authors find that a simple model in which each gate presented to the 
subject can induce discrimination errors is successful in explaining much of 
these anchoring effects. Thus variation in unfolding bracket gates, in tandem 
with the discrimination model or an alternative model of anchoring, promises 
to be effective in identifying the effects of anchoring and in undoing most of 
these effects. The authors recommend that survey researchers who wish to use 
unfolding bracket  elicitations adopt experimental  variations  in their designs 
that permit identification and correction of anchoring biases and that they exer- 
cise caution in imputing economic variables based on stated brackets. 
Accounting for Uncertainty in Social Security Forecasts 
Social security forecasts of reserve fund balances typically provide median, 
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are based on the median forecasts and tend to ignore the high and low esti- 
mates. But even these high and low estimates provide a grossly inadequate 
picture of the true uncertainty faced by the system. In their paper “Stochastic 
Forecasts for Social Security” Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar begin  to 
develop a method that does provide a realistic picture of the uncertainty inher- 
ent in projections of fund reserves. 
Population aging is projected to have a major impact on the federal budget 
in the next century, in part through its effects on health costs through Medicare 
and Medicaid, and in part through its effect on the retirement system. Despite 
the inevitability of the aging of the baby boom, and its dramatic effect on the 
old age dependency ratio, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the extent 
of future population  aging. On the one hand, we do not  know  how rapidly 
mortality will decline and how  long people will be living, and on the other 
hand, we do not know what fertility will be, and therefore we do not know how 
large the labor force will be in the future. Immigration  adds another layer of 
uncertainty, but it is not considered in this paper. In addition to these demo- 
graphic  sources of  uncertainty,  there are economic variables with important 
effects on the future finances of the social security system, notably the rate of 
growth of productivity or real wages and the level of the real interest rate. Lee 
and Tuljapurkar emphasize that rational and foresightful planning for the next 
century must somehow take into account not just our best guesses about the 
future but also our best assessments of the degree of certainty about the future. 
Currently, scenario-based forecasts are in virtually universal  use. In these, 
the forecaster chooses, for each variable, a medium or best-guess trajectory, 
complemented by high and low trajectories. Then one trajectory for each vari- 
able is grouped with others in a scenario, or collection of  trajectories. These 
scenarios may, in turn, be described as “high,” “medium,” or “low,” or by other 
terms such as “optimistic” and “pessimistic.” A high scenario would typically 
be based on a high trajectory for fertility and migration and a low trajectory 
for mortality; this combination would yield high population growth. Alterna- 
tively, a low-cost scenario for social security would bundle together high fertil- 
ity and migration  with high, rather than  low, mortality;  this scenario would 
generate the lowest old age dependency ratio. For the social security forecast, 
this low-cost demographic scenario would then be combined with high trajec- 
tories for productivity growth and (perhaps) for interest rates. The authors em- 
phasize that this approach provides a very inadequate appreciation of the true 
uncertainty faced by the social security system. 
In this paper, the authors build on earlier work to develop stochastic fore- 
casts of the social security reserve fund. Their forecasts are based on stochastic 
models for fertility, mortality, productivity  growth, and interest rates, which 
are fitted on historical data at the same time that they are constrained (except 
for mortality) to conform in long-run expected value to the middle assumptions 
of the Social Security Administration (SSA). The four factors the authors have 
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of the SSA projections, they find that the four variables they treat as stochastic 
account for 76 percent of  the width of the SSA low-cost-high-cost  range in 
2070, and 63 and 70 percent in 2020 and 2045, respectively. 
The authors emphasize that they are still at early stages of digesting their 
stochastic forecasts of the finances of the social security system and are still 
exploring new ways in which these forecasts and experiments might be useful 
and informative. Perhaps, they say, the most promising use is to test the conse- 
quences of a range of strategies for dealing with the uncertainty about the sys- 
tem’s finances. Is it better to wait and see, adjusting policy continuously as we 
gain information? Or is it better to accumulate large reserves early on, to pro- 
vide a buffer against unlikely but possible transitory insults to the system? Or 
should policy simply be set to deal reasonably with the mean trajectory, ignor- 
ing the uncertainty? 
Views of Inequality 
Health Inequality over the Life Cycle 
In earlier work Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson documented that in sev- 
eral developed and developing countries inequality in income, consumption, 
and earnings increase with age. They now ask whether this phenomenon is true 
of other individual attributes as well. In “Health, Income, and Inequality over 
the Life Cycle” they begin to explore the relationship between age and inequal- 
ity in health  status. They find substantial evidence that, indeed, measures of 
health status become more widely dispersed within any given birth cohort as 
that cohort ages. 
In their previous work, Deaton and Paxson used data from the United States, 
Great  Britain, Taiwan, and Thailand  to document  that  inequality  increases 
within cohorts with age for consumption, income, and earnings. In this paper, 
they extend the analysis to two health-relevant measures, the body-mass index 
(BMI) and self-reported health  status (SRHS). They use data on more than 
500,000 adults in the United  States to track birth  cohorts over time and to 
document the evolution of the two measures with age, looking at both cohort 
means and within-cohort dispersion. They also consider the life cycle profile 
of dispersion in income and health jointly, presenting evidence separately for 
men and women, and for blacks and whites. 
Their original work on consumption and income inequality was motivated 
by the prediction of  the standard theory of  intertemporal choice that within- 
cohort inequality in consumption and income should increase with cohort age, 
at least up to the date of  retirement.  Although  the theory has no immediate 
extension to processes other than income and consumption, the authors point 
out that there are a number of reasons to extend the analysis to health status. 
First, they wish to investigate the generality of the proposition that disper- 
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is true of  income, consumption,  and  earnings. They  are  now  curious as to 
whether the proposition is true for other state variables, such as weight, BMI, 
SRHS, dexterity, intelligence, or ability to complete specified tasks. 
Second, while health status is interesting as an example, it is also important 
in its own right. Inequalities in income and consumption are of  concern be- 
cause they are important components of welfare. But as we move from a nar- 
row, economic measure of well-being toward broader definitions, health status 
has the most immediate claim on our attention. Nor is health status indepen- 
dent of  economic  status. Access to health  care is expensive  in  the  United 
States, so that health shocks can have a direct effect on wealth. Independent of 
this effect, there is a well-documented but poorly understood relationship link- 
ing socioeconomic status to a wide range of health outcomes. There is also a 
literature linking health status to relative deprivation, or to the income distribu- 
tion. Third, it is plausible that the theoretical reasons that consumption,  in- 
come, and earnings processes disperse also apply to health status. 
Deaton  and  Paxson present  evidence  on life cycle  patterns  of  BMI and 
SRHS, as well as on their relationship with income. They emphasize that it is 
important to explore differences between people in their health, even in the 
absence of an agreed methodology for thinking about inequality in health sta- 
tus, or even about health status itself. But by the same token, it is important to 
be cautious about attributing causality to any of their findings.  Income and 
their measures of health status are linked in many different ways, through abil- 
ity to pay for health, through education that is correlated with income, through 
lifestyle choices-such  as whether to smoke and what to eat-that  are condi- 
tioned by income, race, and sex. 
From their findings, the authors highlight the following: 
There is ample evidence for the proposition with which they began, that 
their  two  measures  of  health  status  become  more  widely  dispersed 
within  any given birth  cohort as that cohort ages. They view  this as 
evidence in favor of a cumulative random model of health status. 
The rate of dispersion with age of BMI, but not of SRHS, is much more 
rapid for women than for men. BMI is more variable among women to 
start with.  SRHS is more variable among young women than  among 
young men, possibly reflecting pregnancy. 
Health status (positively measured) is positively correlated with income 
within cohort-year-sex cells. The correlation is lowest for the young, 
increases until  age 50-60,  and then diminishes. BMI is uncorrelated 
with incomes for men, but negatively  correlated with incomes among 
women. This correlation is highest in middle age. 
The joint distribution of SRHS and income and the joint distribution of 
BMI and income “fan out” with age. 19  Introduction 
Blacks consistently report lower health  status than  do whites.  Some 
fraction-but  not all-of  this difference can be attributed to the lower 
income of blacks. Less of the difference is explained by income among 
women  than  among men, a result  that is even  more pronounced for 
BMI. 
Pensions and Inequality 
Quite a different view of  inequality is investigated by  Kathleen McGarry 
and  Andrew  Davenport.  In  their  paper  “Pensions  and  the  Distribution  of 
Wealth’ they consider whether pensions increase or decrease inequality in the 
wealth of families approaching retirement. They find that pensions somewhat 
increase wealth inequality and find no evidence that pensions crowd out pri- 
vate savings. 
Over the past few decades, the financial status of the elderly improved dra- 
matically. Poverty rates for those age 65 or over fell from 25 percent in 1970 
to 14 percent in  1994. These gains are attributed in large part to increases in 
the generosity of the social security program. Yet despite the inclusiveness of 
the social security system and the progressivity  of the benefit schedule, some 
subgroups of the elderly continue to face disproportionately high risks of pov- 
erty. Unmarried women, for example, had a poverty rate of 22 percent in 1994, 
while the poverty rate for married women was 5 percent. Similarly, the poverty 
rate for elderly blacks is close to three times that for elderly whites (31 vs. 
12 percent). 
Social security is just one component of retirement income and given the 
structure of benefits, differences across individuals in the level of social secu- 
rity wealth  are likely to be  small in comparison  to differences in the other 
components  of  total  wealth.  The large  differences  in  economic  well-being 
within  the  elderly population  therefore  stem from differences  in the  other 
modes of savings. Recently, much has been written about differences in net 
worth and savings behavior. Less well studied are differences in pension wealth 
and the interaction of pensions and individual wealth. 
In this paper, McGarry and Davenport take advantage of the HRS to focus 
on differences in pension wealth for various subgroups of the retirement age 
population. They ask how pensions affect the distribution of wealth in the pop- 
ulation. They compare the distribution of net worth to the distribution of pri- 
vate wealth  (net worth plus pension wealth) and to the distribution of  total 
wealth (net worth plus pensions wealth plus social security wealth). 
They  find  evidence  that  pensions  somewhat  increase  the  inequality  of 
wealth across the population. They demonstrate the relationship between total 
wealth  and inequality directly and find that single women  in particular  fare 
much worse relative  to single men  and couples when pension wealth  is in- 
cluded  in the calculation  of  total  wealth.  The paucity  of  pension  holdings 
among women suggests that their eventual well-being as widows will depend 20  David A. Wise 
heavily  on the resources  left after the death of  a  spouse. Thus the  issue of 
survivorship benefits for pensions  will have important  consequences for the 
eventual poverty rates of widows. While the results are purely descriptive, the 
authors fail to find evidence to support the notion  that  pensions  crowd  out 
private savings. 
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